Thought insertion and immunity to error through misidentification

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):27-34 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX


John Campbell (1999) has recently maintained that the phenomenon of thought insertion as it is manifested in schizophrenic patients should be described as a case in which the subject is introspectively aware of a certain thought and yet she is wrong in identifying whose thought it is. Hence, according to Campbell, the phenomenon of thought insertion might be taken as a counterexample to the view that introspection-based mental selfascriptions are logically immune to error through misidentification (IEM, hereafter). Thus, if Campbell is right, it would not be true that when the subject makes a mental self-ascription on the basis of introspective awareness of a given mental state, there is no possible world in which she could be wrong as to whether it is really she who has that mental state. Notice the interesting interdisciplinary implications of Campbell’s project: on the one hand, a fairly precise notion elaborated in philosophy such as IEM (and the related notion of error through misidentification, EM hereafter) is used to describe a characteristic symptom of schizophrenia.1 On the other hand, such a phenomenon, described in the way proposed, is taken to be a possible counterexample to a sort of “philosophical dogma” such as IEM of introspection-based non-inferential mental self-ascriptions. In the first section of the paper I will point out the characteristic features of EM and explain logical immunity to error through misidentification of introspection-based mental self-ascriptions; in the second section I will consider the case of thought insertion in more detail and show why, after all, it is not a counterexample to the view that introspectionbased mental self-ascriptions are logically IEM. Finally, I will offer a re-description of the phenomenon of thought insertion



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 77,916

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Reply to John Campbell.Annalisa Coliva - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):41-46.
Bodily Awareness and Immunity to Error through Misidentification.Cheryl K. Chen - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):21-38.
Two takes on the De Se.Marina Folescu & James Higginbotham - 2012 - In Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Self-Consciousness and Immunity.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):78-99.
Which immunity to error?Joel Smith - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):273-83.


Added to PP

254 (#50,793)

6 months
5 (#168,422)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Annalisa Coliva
University of California, Irvine

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references