Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):465-490 (2000)
I argue for a cognitive architecture in which folk psychology is supported by an interface of a ToM module and the language faculty, the latter providing the former with interpreted LF structures which form the content representations of ToM states. I show that LF structures satisfy a range of key features asked of contents. I confront this account of ToM with eliminativism and diagnose and combat the thought that "success" and innateness are inconsistent with the falsity of folk psychology. I show that, while my ensemble account of ToM and language refutes the culturalist presuppositions that tend to underlie eliminativist arguments, the falsity of folk psychology is consistent with the account.
|Keywords||Eliminativism Logical Form Metaphysics Mind Module Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Nativism: In Defense of a Biological Understanding.John M. Collins - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):157-177.
On the Input Problem for Massive Modularity.John M. Collins - 2004 - Minds and Machines 15 (1):1-22.
Similar books and articles
Transcendental Arguments Against Eliminativism.Robert Lockie - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):569-589.
Deconstructing the Mind.Stephen P. Stich - 1996 - In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. pp. 479-482.
External Accounts of Folk Psychology, Eliminativism, and the Simulation Theory.Joel Pust - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (1):113-130.
Don't Stop Believing: The Case Against Eliminative Materialism.Barbara Hannan - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):165-179.
How Not to Refute Eliminative Materialism.Kenneth A. Taylor - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):101-125.
The Architectural Nonchalance of Commonsense Psychology.Radu J. Bogdan - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):189-205.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads65 ( #78,552 of 2,153,578 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #398,274 of 2,153,578 )
How can I increase my downloads?