Authors
Annalisa Coliva
University of California, Irvine
Abstract
Moore’s proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright’s nor Pryor’s readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, or for belief in the existence of an external world itself. I show how Wright’s and Pryor’s positions are of interest when taken in connection with Humean scepticism, but that it is only linking it with Cartesian scepticism which can explain why the proof strikes us as an obvious failure.
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References found in this work BETA

The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
Facts and Certainty.Crispin Wright - 1986 - In Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 71: 1985. Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press. pp. 429-472.
Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission and Easy Knowledge.Martin Davies - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):213-245.

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