In Machine Medical Ethics. London: Springer. pp. 79-92 (2015)

Gary Comstock
North Carolina State University
A properly programmed artificially intelligent agent may eventually have one duty, the duty to satisfice expected welfare. We explain this claim and defend it against objections.
Keywords satisficing utilitarianism  act utilitarianism  machine ethics  medical ethics  robotic ethics  AI ethics  R. M. Hare  Gary Varner  W. D. Ross  artificial agents
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