Evidence of evidence is evidence

Analysis 75 (4):557-559 (2015)
Authors
Juan Comesaña
University of Arizona
Eyal Tal
University of Cologne
Abstract
Richard Feldman has proposed and defended different versions of a principle about evidence. In slogan form, the principle holds that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. Recently, Branden Fitelson has argued that Feldman’s preferred rendition of the principle falls pray to a counterexample related to the non-transitivity of the evidence-for relation. Feldman replies arguing that Fitelson’s case does not really represent a counterexample to the principle. In this note, we argue that Feldman’s principle is trivially true.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/analys/anv072
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,457
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Tal and Comesaña on Evidence of Evidence.Luca Moretti - 2016 - The Reasoner 10 (5):38-39.
When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):142-156.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Evidentialism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs.Tommaso Piazza - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):311 - 324.
Religious Disagreements and Epistemic Rationality.David M. Holley - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):33-48.
No Evidence is False.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):145-159.
Objective Evidence and Absence: Comment on Sober.Michael Strevens - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (1):91 - 100.
Evidence Does Not Equal Knowledge.Aaron Rizzieri - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):235-242.
Knowing Without Evidence.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):309-331.
What Evidence Do You Have?Ram Neta - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):89-119.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-10-08

Total downloads
64 ( #100,240 of 2,285,741 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #122,244 of 2,285,741 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature