Escepticismo semántico y teorías del significado

Análisis Filosófico 18 (2):143-150 (1998)

Juan Comesaña
University of Arizona
In several works H. Putnam has developed an argument addressed against “realist” semantic theories . In this paper I argue that Putnam´s argument is weaker than what is generally supposed as Devitt has shown in Realism and Truth. I desagree, however, with Devitt´s latest strategy against model-theoretic arguments as presented in an “Afterword” to that book
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