Authors
Juan Comesaña
University of Arizona
Abstract
In this paper I argue that McDowell’s brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill-motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a “highest common factor” between veridical and non-veridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI ppr200571226
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A Plea for Falsehoods.Juan Comesaña - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):247-276.
Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):434-455.
Disjunctivism.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Oxford Annotated Bibliographies Online.

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