A oposição de Berkeley ao ceticismo

Abstract

One of Berkeley’s main goals in the Principles and in the Three Dialogues, as expressly stated in the full titles these two works, as well as in the Philosophical Commen-taries, is the refutation of skepticism. This article aims to elucidate what Berkeley means by skepticism and to indicate which principles or doctrines, according to him, are at the root of the skeptics’ doubts. An attempt is made to show how Berkeley elaborated his opposition to skepticism. Finally, it is suggested that Berkeley’s (alleged) refutation of the skepticism, given his doctrine of immaterialism, is not based only on the esse est percipi principle, but also on the thesis that the objects and their sensible qualities are immedi-ately perceived. It is pointed out that, in Berkeley’s view, this thesis is compatible with common sense, what makes it plausible to consider his theory of perception as a form of direct realism.

Download options

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-07-27

Downloads
461 (#21,255)

6 months
31 (#28,982)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Common Sense and Berkeley's Perception by Suggestion.Jody Graham - 1997 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (3):397 – 423.
Book Review. [REVIEW]Michael Newman - 1990 - British Journal of Aesthetics 30 (4):390-392.
Berkeley's "Esse Is Percipi" and Collier's "Simple" Argument.Tom Stoneham - 2006 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 23 (3):211-224.
Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Jay Newman, Martin A. Bertman & Finngeir Hiorth - 1992 - Philosophia 21 (3-4):339-349.
Berkeley on Immediate Perception: Once More Unto the Breach.Georges Dicker - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):517–535.
Berkeley and Irish Philosophy.David Berman - 2005 - Thoemmes Continuum.
Meaning, Signification, and Suggestion: Berkeley on General Words.Timothy Pritchard - 2012 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (3):301-317.