A Puzzle about Further Facts

Erkenntnis 84 (3):727-739 (2019)

Abstract
In metaphysics, there are a number of distinct but related questions about the existence of “further facts”—facts that are contingent relative to the physical structure of the universe. These include further facts about qualia, personal identity, and time. In this article I provide a sequence of examples involving computer simulations, ranging from one in which the protagonist can clearly conclude such further facts exist to one that describes our own condition. This raises the question of where along the sequence the protagonist stops being able to soundly conclude that further facts exist.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-018-9979-6
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References found in this work BETA

Inverted Earth.Ned Block - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.
Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?Nick Bostrom - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):243-255.

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