Does perception outstrip our concepts in fineness of grain?

Ratio 24 (3):243-258 (2011)
We seem perfectly able to perceive fine-grained shades of colour even without possessing precise concepts for them. The same might be said of shapes. I argue that this is in fact not the case. A subject can perceive a colour or shape only if she possesses a concept of that type of colour or shape. I provide new justification for this thesis, and do not rely on demonstrative concepts such as THIS SHADE or THAT SHAPE, a move first suggested by John McDowell, but rejected by Christopher Peacocke and Richard Heck among others.1
Keywords Perception  Concepts  Color  Richness  Demonstratives
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00498.x
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Which Kantian Conceptualism (or Nonconceptualism)?Kevin Connolly - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):316-337.

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