Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2004)
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Abstract |
Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This book is a collection of essays, mostly jointly authored, that support and apply evidentialism.
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Keywords | Knowledge, Theory of |
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Buy this book | $50.43 new (10% off) $56.00 from Amazon Amazon page |
Call number | BD161.C645 2004 |
ISBN(s) | 0199253730 9780199253739 9780199253722 0199253722 |
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The Ethics of Belief
Discusses the merits of versions of doxastic voluntarism, the thesis that we form beliefs voluntarily. It criticizes some forms of doxastic voluntarism, but concedes that we do have a kind of indirect control over our beliefs. The chapter also examines various theses about the attitudes th... see more
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Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.
On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
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