Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology
Oxford University Press (2004)
| Abstract |
Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view ofjustification.
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| Keywords | Knowledge, Theory of |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| Buy the book | $46.14 new (17% off) $50.37 used (9% off) $55.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page |
| Call number | BD161.C645 2004 |
| ISBN(s) | 0199253730 9780199253739 9780199253722 |
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Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Jack Lyons - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.
How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):251-275.
You Ought to Φ Only If You May Believe That You Ought to Φ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.
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Similar books and articlesReplies.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
Evidentialism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs.Tommaso Piazza - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):311 - 324.
Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):294-312.
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