Evidentialism: essays in epistemology

New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Richard Feldman (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition. Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve the problem of the criterion, helps to disentangle epistemic and ethical evaluations, and illuminates the relationship between epistemic evaluations of beliefs and the evaluation of the methods used to form beliefs. These issues are all addressed in the essays presented here. External world skepticism poses the classic problem for an epistemological theory. The final essay in this volume argues that evidentialism is uniquely well qualified to make sense of skepticism and to respond to its challenge. Evidentialism is a version of epistemic internalism. Recent epistemology has included many attacks on internalism and has seen the development of numerous externalist theories. The essays included here respond to those attacks and raise objections to externalist theories, especially the principal rival, reliabilism. Internalism generally has been criticized for having unacceptable deontological implications, for failing to connect epistemic justification to truth, and for failing to provide an adequate account of what makes basic beliefs justified. Each of these charges is answered in these essays. The collection includes two previously unpublished essays and new afterwords to five of the reprinted essays; it will be the definitive resource on evidentialism for all epistemologists.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,517

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Brink Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Edited by Richard Feldman.
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):147-149.
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. [REVIEW]John Greco - 2005 - International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):556-558.
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.John Greco - 2005 - International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):556-558.
Responsibilist Evidentialism.Christopher Michael Cloos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2999-3016.
Evidence.Michael Tooley - 2019 - In Graham Oppy (ed.), A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy. Hoboken: Blackwell. pp. 303–322.
Evidentialism and the Great Pumpkin objection.Michael Bergmann - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 123-33.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
187 (#109,003)

6 months
20 (#173,440)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Earl Conee
University of Rochester

Citations of this work

Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
Having reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71.
On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.

View all 107 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references