Good to know

Philosophical Studies 174 (2):311-331 (2017)
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Abstract

Our curiosity has us interested in finding out the truth. Knowing the fact of the matter fulfills the interest. This fulfillment is something satisfying about knowledge. Additionally, knowledge is a good way for a person to relate to a proposition. Knowing is good because of what knowledge is. In other words, knowledge is intrinsically good. The credibility of these assessments calls for some explanation. A traditional view is that knowledge is justified true belief with no Gettier accidents. This conception is particularly helpful in accounting for the assessments of knowledge. Features of the relation of a mind to a known proposition that are articulated in the traditional view make the relation satisfying and attractive. What is explicit in the traditional view renders these assets of knowledge readily understandable. The view explains the assets better than do alternative conceptions of knowledge

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Earl Conee
University of Rochester

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.

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