Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):455-461 (2002)
AbstractIf we want to see justice done with regard to responsibility, then we must either (i) allow that people are never morally responsible, (iia) show that luck is not ubiquitous or at least that (iib) ubiquitous luck is not moral, or (iii) show that ascriptions of responsibility can retain justice despite the omnipresence of luck. This paper defends (iii); ascriptions of responsibility can be just even though luck is ubiquitous.
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Dissolving the Puzzle of Resultant Moral Luck.Neil Levy - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):127-139.
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The Problem of Moral Luck: An Argument Against its Epistemic Reduction.Anders Schinkel - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):267-277.
References found in this work
Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (1):115-152.
Moral Luck.Thomas Nagel - 1993 - In Daniel Statman (ed.), Moral Luck. State University of New York Press. pp. 141--166.