Episteme 6 (3):313-323 (2009)
Experts take sides in standing scholarly disagreements. They rely on the epistemic reasons favorable to their side to justify their position. It is argued here that no position actually has an overall balance of undefeated reasons in its favor. Candidates for such reasons include the objective strength of the rational support for one side, the special force of details in the case for one side, and a summary impression of truth. All such factors fail to justify any position.
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References found in this work BETA
Rational Disagreement Defended.Earl Conee - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Indirect Epistemic Reasons and Religious Belief.Kirk Lougheed & Robert Mark Simpson - 2017 - Religious Studies 53 (2):151-169.
Disagreement and the First‐Person Perspective.Gurpreet Rattan - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):31-53.
Moral Caution and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (2):120-141.
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