Religious Studies 48 (1):61-82 (2012)

Authors
Christopher H. Conn
Sewanee, The University of the South
Abstract
In this article I object to Le Poidevin's contention that relative identity is beset with an infinite metaphysical regress. I argue, first, that since Le Poidevin's regress argument presupposes a direct theory of reference, it does not apply to accounts of relative identity which reject this account of reference. I argue, second, that Le Poidevin's regress is not inevitable for one who accepts a direct account of reference, since it does not apply to the formal logic of relative identity which van Inwagen uses to articulate and defend the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.
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DOI 10.1017/S0034412511000035
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Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Sameness and Substance.David Wiggins - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Reference and Description Revisited.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:201-218.

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