Relative identity, singular reference, and the Incarnation : a response to Le Poidevin

Religious Studies 48 (1):61-82 (2012)

Abstract

In this article I object to Le Poidevin's contention that relative identity is beset with an infinite metaphysical regress. I argue, first, that since Le Poidevin's regress argument presupposes a direct theory of reference, it does not apply to accounts of relative identity which reject this account of reference. I argue, second, that Le Poidevin's regress is not inevitable for one who accepts a direct account of reference, since it does not apply to the formal logic of relative identity which van Inwagen uses to articulate and defend the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

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Christopher H. Conn
Sewanee, The University of the South

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Sameness and Substance.David Wiggins - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Logic Matters.Peter Thomas Geach - 1972 - Berkeley, CA, USA: Blackwell.

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