In Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Continuum Press. pp. 120--137 (2011)
AbstractMy two daughters would love to go tobogganing down the hill by themselves, but they are just toddlers and I am an apprehensive parent, so, before letting them do so, I want to ensure that the toboggan won’t go too fast. But how fast will it go? One way to try to answer this question would be to tackle the problem head on. Since my daughters and their toboggan are initially at rest, according to classical mechanics, their final velocity will be determined by the forces they will be subjected to between the moment the toboggan will be released at the top of the hill and the moment it will reach its highest speed. The problem is that, throughout their downhill journey, my daughters and the toboggan will be subjected to an incredibly large number of forces—from the gravitational pull of any massive object in the universe to the weight of the snowflake that is sitting on the tip of one of my youngest daughter’s hairs—so that any attempt to apply the theory directly to the real-world system in all its complexity seems to be doomed to failure
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References found in this work
The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science.Nancy Cartwright - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work
External Representations and Scientific Understanding.Jaakko Kuorikoski & Petri Ylikoski - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):3817-3837.
Idealization and Abstraction in Scientific Modeling.Demetris Portides - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 24):5873-5895.
Varieties of Misrepresentation and Homomorphism.Francesca Pero & Mauricio Suárez - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (1):71-90.
On the Pragmatic Equivalence Between Representing Data and Phenomena.James Nguyen - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (2):171- 191.
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