Philosophical Investigations 21 (3):222–250 (1998)

James Ferguson Conant
Universität Leipzig
Wittgenstein is usually taken to have held that the use of a term is not mentally constrained. That is utterly wrong. A use of language unconstrained by meaning is attributed by him to "meaning-blind" or "aspect-blind" creatures, not to us. We observe meaning when an aspect dawns on us; meaning is the impression (Eindruck) of a term as fitting something; hence, unlike pain, it cannot stand alone. That is a mentalistic theory of meaning: use is determined by images (Vorstellungen) that play semantic roles in virtue of their aesthetic properties. Although a term may be arbitrarily interpreted, aesthetic reasons determine which interpretation be seen as right for it.
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9205.00069
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Contemporary Ordinary Language Philosophy.Nat Hansen - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (8):556-569.
Which Hinge Epistemology?Annalisa Coliva - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):79-96.
Wittgenstein, Ethics and Basic Moral Certainty.Nigel Pleasants - 2008 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):241 – 267.
Languages, Language-Games, and Forms of Life.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - In H.-J. Glock & J. Hyman (eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein. Wiley-Blackwell.

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