Austinian truth, attitudes and type theory ∗

Abstract

This paper is part of a broader project whose aim is to present a coherent unified approach to natural language dialogue semantics using tools from type theory. Here we explore aspects of our approach which relate to situation theory and situation semantics. We first point out a relationship between type theory and the Austinian notion of truth. We then consider how records in type theory might be used to represent situations and how dependent record types can be used to model constraints on situations. We then sketch treatments of attitude phenomena for which Barwise and Perry proposed situation semantic analyses (perception complements, belief, the Pierre puzzle) as well as two other intensional phenomena (intensional verbs and intentional identity). Finally we give a characterisation of the type theory used and a small illustrative fragment of English.

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2010-12-22

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Citations of this work

Reductionism About Understanding Why.Insa Lawler - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (2):229-236.
Monotonicity in Opaque Verbs.Thomas Ede Zimmermann - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (6):715 - 761.
Grounding as a Side‐Effect of Grounding.Staffan Larsson - 2018 - Topics in Cognitive Science 10 (2):389-408.
Constructing Situations and Time.Tim Fernando - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (3):371 - 396.

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