Conceptual fallacies in subjective probability

Topoi 5 (1):21-27 (1986)
Abstract
Subjective probability considered as a logic of partial belief succumbs to three fundamental fallacies. These concern the representation of preference via expectation, the measurability of partial belief, and the normalization of belief.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00137826
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The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Logic of Decision.Richard Jeffrey - 1965 - University of Chicago Press.

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