Should Anti-Realists be Anti-Realists About Anti-Realism?

Erkenntnis 79 (S2):233-258 (2014)
On the Dummettian understanding, anti-realism regarding a particular discourse amounts to (or at the very least, involves) a refusal to accept the determinacy of the subject matter of that discourse and a corresponding refusal to assert at least some instances of excluded middle (which can be understood as expressing this determinacy of subject matter). In short: one is an anti-realist about a discourse if and only if one accepts intuitionistic logic as correct for that discourse. On careful examination, the strongest Dummettian arguments for anti-realism of this sort fail to secure intuitionistic logic as the single, correct logic for anti-realist discourses. Instead, antirealists are placed in a situation where they fail to be justified in asserting monism (that intuitionistic logic is the unique correct logic). Thus, antirealists seem forced either to accept pluralism (i.e. one or more intermediate logic is at least as `correct’ as intuitionistic logic–an option I take to be unattractive from the anti-realist perspective), or they must be anti-realists about the realism/anti-realism debate (and, in particular, must refuse to assert the instance of excluded middle equivalent to logical monism or logical pluralism)
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9475-y
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Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1978 - Harvard University Press.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
The Taming of the True.Neil Tennant - 1997 - Oxford University Press.

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