Still counterintuitive: A reply to Kremer

Analysis 63 (3):257–261 (2003)
Roy T. Cook
University of Minnesota
In (2002) I argued that Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth (1993) has counterintuitive consequences. In particular, the pair of sentences: (S1) At least one of S1 and S2 is false. (S2) Both of S1 and S2 are false.1 is pathological on the Revision account. There is one, and only one, assignment of truth values to {(S1), (S2)} that make the corresponding Tarski..
Keywords truth   paradox   revision theory
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00432
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