Still counterintuitive: A reply to Kremer

Analysis 63 (279):257–261 (2003)
In (2002) I argued that Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth (1993) has counterintuitive consequences. In particular, the pair of sentences: (S1) At least one of S1 and S2 is false. (S2) Both of S1 and S2 are false.1 is pathological on the Revision account. There is one, and only one, assignment of truth values to {(S1), (S2)} that make the corresponding Tarski..
Keywords truth   paradox   revision theory
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00432
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,433
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Shawn Standefer (2015). On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation. Australasian Journal of Logic 12 (3):135-158.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

113 ( #40,011 of 1,925,039 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

19 ( #31,204 of 1,925,039 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.