Deviant encodings and Turing's analysis of computability

Abstract
Turing’s analysis of computability has recently been challenged; it is claimed that it is circular to analyse the intuitive concept of numerical computability in terms of the Turing machine. This claim threatens the view, canonical in mathematics and cognitive science, that the concept of a systematic procedure or algorithm is to be explicated by reference to the capacities of Turing machines. We defend Turing’s analysis against the challenge of ‘deviant encodings’.Keywords: Systematic procedure; Turing machine; Church–Turing thesis; Deviant encoding; Acceptable encoding; Turing’s analysis of computability; Turing’s Notational Thesis
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.07.010
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References found in this work BETA
On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem.Alan Turing - 1936 - Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 42 (1):230-265.
The Church-Turing Thesis.B. Jack Copeland - 2008 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Church's Thesis and the Conceptual Analysis of Computability.Michael Rescorla - 2007 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 48 (2):253-280.
Mechanical Procedures and Mathematical Experience.Wilfried Sieg - 1994 - In Alexander George (ed.), Mathematics and Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 71--117.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Representational Foundations of Computation.Michael Rescorla - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 23 (3):338-366.
Copeland and Proudfoot on Computability.Michael Rescorla - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):199-202.
Computable Diagonalizations and Turing's Cardinality Paradox.Dale Jacquette - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (2):239-262.

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