Noûs 31 (4):441-456 (1997)
According to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for an action only if he could have done otherwise. PAP underlies a familiar argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility with determinism. I argue that Harry Frankfurt's famous argument against PAP is unsuccessful if PAP is interpreted as a principle about blameworthiness. My argument turns on the maxim that "ought implies can" as well as a "finely-nuanced" view of the object of blame. To reject PAP on the blameworthiness interpretation, we must reject either this maxim or the finely-nuanced view or some other apparently innocuous assumption
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Blameworthiness Without Wrongdoing.Justin A. Capes - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):417-437.
Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
Action, Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise.Justin Capes - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15.
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