Philosophia 6 (3-4):447-461 (1976)

The purpose of the article is to explain two curious doctrines maintained by frege and rejected by wittgenstein in the 'tractatus logico-philosophicus'. that a special assertion sign is necessary was maintained by frege because he wanted to apply his concept-writing to ordinary language, and it was rejected by wittgenstein because his concern in the 'tractatus' was with scientific assertions only. frege's paradoxical notion that 'the concept horse is not a concept' was a consequence of his symbolizing functions by 'unsaturated' expressions. wittgenstein's picture theory eliminated expressions for relations and thereby avoided the fregean paradox
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DOI 10.1007/BF02379285
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References found in this work BETA

On Herr Peano's Begriffsschrift and My Own.Gottlob Frege - 1969 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):1 – 14.
Retractation.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1965 - Analysis 26 (2):33 - 36.
The Ghost of the Tractatus.Anthony Kenny - 1973 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 7:1-13.
On the Begriffsschrift of Herr Peano and My Own.G. Frege - 1969 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47:1.

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