Philosophical Studies 62 (3):203 - 233 (1991)
"Moral skepticism" is the thesis that no moral code or standard is or could be objectively justified. It constitutes as important a challenge to anti-skeptical moral theory as does skepticism about God to theistic philosophies. It expresses intuitive doubts, but it also entails the falsity of a variety of philosophical theories. It entails a denial of moral knowledge and truth, but one could reject it without holding that there is such knowledge or truth. An anti-skeptical theory could be a familiar "epistemic theory," but it could also be a "practical theory," according to which some moral code has an appropriate justification in practical reason
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Confirmation Theory and Moral Justification.Edward D. Sherline - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):225 - 238.
Years of Moral Epistemology: A Bibliography.Laura Donohue & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):217-229.
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