Review of Metaphysics 49 (3):651-653 (1996)

Paul Copan
Marquette University (PhD)
Felt, a philosophy professor at Santa Clara University, has helpfully expounded the freedom-determinism discussion in a popular, understandable manner. Although he admits that there are no knock-down arguments against determinism, belief in freedom is the more plausible, sensible perspective. Felt presents the basic arguments defending the related concepts of determinism, compatibilism, and fatalism and successfully refutes them. Felt also discusses concepts of temporality, causality, and the problem of evil as they relate to freedom.
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0034-6632
DOI revmetaph199649316
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