On projecting and willing: a contribution to the phenomenology of intentions

Erol Copelj
Monash University
This work is best described as an endeavour to contribute to the phenomenology of intentions, the experiences of intending to do something. It finds its point of departure in the discussion of two ‘analytic philosophers’, John Searle and John McDowell, where two contrasting accounts of intentions are offered. The first task is to derive a hybrid account, according to which there are different kinds of intentions, each having the property of being a potential continuant with prior- and in-action phases. The remainder of the discussion is a phenomenological justification of the hybrid account. Through a critical engagement with work of the classical phenomenologists, descriptions are advanced towards the end of demonstrating that the genus intention splits into the species projecting and willing and that each instantiates the property of being a potential continuant with prior- and in-action phases. This work does not offer a complete justification of the hybrid account; rather, the discussion culminates with the articulation of a concrete phenomenological problem, the answer to which is a condition for the evaluation of the phenomenological merit of the hybrid account. This problem functions as an invitation for other phenomenologists to return to thing themselves and engage in concrete phenomenological work.
Keywords Phenomenology  Intentions  Projecting  Willing  Husserl  Sartre  Schutz
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-015-9419-x
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References found in this work BETA

Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Intentionality.John R. Searle - 1984 - Philosophy 59 (229):417-418.
Phenomenology of the Social World.Alfred Schutz - 1967 - Northwestern University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Displaced Feeling: A Phenomenological Study.Erol Copelj - 2016 - Husserl Studies 32 (1):1-20.

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