Reid on consciousness: Hop, hot or for?

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):613-634 (2007)

Authors
Rebecca Copenhaver
Lewis & Clark College
Abstract
Thomas Reid claims to share Locke's view that consciousness is a kind of inner sense. This is puzzling, given the role the inner-sense theory plays in indirect realism and in the theory of ideas generally. I argue that Reid does not in fact hold an inner-sense theory of consciousness and that his view differs importantly from contemporary higher-order theories of consciousness. For Reid, consciousness is a first-order representational process in which a mental state with a particular content suggests the application of recognitional concepts in forming beliefs or judgements to the effect that one is currently undergoing a state with that content. I take up the question of whether Reid's theory leads to a regress, and I argue that while the regress cannot be eliminated, it is mitigated by the non-hierarchical nature of Reid's theory of mind
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.499.x
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References found in this work BETA

On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Two Concepts of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Phenomenal States.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.
Conscious Experience.Fred Dretske - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):263-283.

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Citations of this work BETA

Revisiting the Early Modern Philosophical Canon.Lisa Shapiro - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (3):365-383.
Reid on Single and Double Vision: Mechanics and Morals.James van Cleve - 2008 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (1):1-20.
Reid on Powers of the Mind and the Person Behind the Curtain.Laurent Jaffro - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1):197-213.

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