Cora Diamond and the Moral Imagination

Nordic Wittgenstein Review 5 (1):55-77 (2016)
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Abstract

Over several decades, Cora Diamond has articulated a distinctive way of thinking about ethics. Prompted by a recent critique of Diamond, we elucidate some of the main themes of her work, and reveal their power to reconfigure and deepen moral philosophy. In concluding, we suggest that Diamond’s moral philosophical practice can be seen as one plausible way of fleshing out what Wittgenstein might have meant by his dictum that “ethics is transcendental”.

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Author Profiles

Christopher Donald Cordner
University of Melbourne
Andrew Gleeson
Flinders University

References found in this work

Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.
I: A lecture on ethics.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):3-12.
“Our fellow creatures”.Jeff McMahan - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):353 - 380.
Ethics, imagination and the method of Wittgenstein's Tractatus.Cora Diamond - 2000 - In Alice Crary & Rupert J. Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein. New York: Routledge. pp. 149-173.

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