Synthese:1-14 (forthcoming)

Authors
Daniel Coren
McMaster University
Abstract
My subject is the kind of Epistemic Conservatism (EC) that says that an agent is in some measure justified in maintaining a belief simply in virtue of the fact that the agent has that belief. Quine’s alternative to positivist foundationalism, Chisholmian particularism, Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, and Bayesianism all seem to rely on EC. I argue that, in order to evaluate EC, we must consider an agent holding a bare belief, that is, a belief stripped of all personal memory and epistemic context. Taking a stylistic cue from Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment", I argue that, though it does not seem to be self-contradictory to suppose that someone has a bare belief, and so it is not absolutely inconceivable that bare beliefs exist, it is, for us as we are, practically inconceivable that bare beliefs exist. It does not seem practically feasible, then, to evaluate EC on its own terms.
Keywords Agency  Epistemic Conservatism  Bare Beliefs
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-02059-8
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References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
Judgement and Justification.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Evaluating Epistemic Virtues.Daniel Coren - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1569-1578.

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