From Maclean's Triune Brain Concept to the Conflict Systems Neurobehavioral Model: The Subjective Basis of Moral and Spiritual Consciousness
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Zygon 35 (2):385-414 (2000)
This paper builds upon a critically clarified statement of the triune brain concept to set out the conflict systems neurobehavioral model. The model defines the reciprocal algorithms of behavior from evolved brain structure. The algorithms are driven by subjectively experienced behavioral tension as the self‐preservational programming, common to our ancestral vertebrates, frequently tugs and pulls against the affectional program‐ming of our mammalian legacy. The yoking of the dual algorithmic dynamic accounts for the emergence of moral and spiritual consciousness as manifested in the universal norm of reciprocity and in the work of such thinkersas Martin Buber and Paul Tillich
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