Theoria 19 (2):155-172 (2004)

Authors
Josep Corbi
University of Valencia
Abstract
Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most promising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both David Lewis’ dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard’s procedural realism
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Philosophy of Science
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ISBN(s) 0495-4548
DOI theoria200419215
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References found in this work BETA

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.
Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry.Bernard Williams (ed.) - 1978 - Hassocks: Harvester Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384-394.

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Citations of this work BETA

First-Person Authority and Self-Knowledge as an Achievement.Josep E. Corbí - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):325-362.
Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception.Joseph E. Corbi - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2):61-80.
The Insight of Empiricism: In Defence of a Hypothetical but Propositional Given.Josep E. Corbí - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):289-298.
The Mud of Experience and Kinds of Awareness.Josep E. Corbí - 2007 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1):5-15.
First‐Person Authority and Self‐Knowledge as an Achievement.Josep E. Corbí - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):325-362.

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