Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations

Theoria 19 (2):155-172 (2004)
Authors
Josep Corbi
University of Valencia
Abstract
Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most promising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both David Lewis’ dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard’s procedural realism
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Philosophy of Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0495-4548  
DOI theoria200419215
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,998
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

First-Person Authority and Self-Knowledge as an Achievement.Josep E. Corbí - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):325-362.
The Insight of Empiricism: In Defence of a Hypothetical but Propositional Given.Josep E. Corbí - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):289-298.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

An Amoral Manifesto Part I.Joel Marks - 2010 - Philosophy Now (80):30-33.
Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs.Don Loeb - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):193–208.
A Biological Alternative to Moral Explanations.Joseph Millum - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):385-407.
Personal Goodness and Moral Facts.Stefan Sencerz - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:481-498.
Do Moral Explanations Matter?Charles Sayward - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:137-142.
Moral Realism and Program Explanation.Mark T. Nelson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):417 – 428.
Devitt on Moral Realism.Boran Berčić - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):63-68.
The Explanationist Argument for Moral Realism.Neil Sinclair - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-24.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
92 ( #68,300 of 2,274,821 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #150,698 of 2,274,821 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature