Philosophical Studies 24 (2):112 - 118 (1973)

Authors
Michael Louis Corrado
University of North Carolina (System)
Abstract
It has been proposed that, Under the restriction of singular terms to proper names, Singular de re propositions would be equivalent to certain de dicto propositions. But that is so only if a certain thesis--A thesis which is itself irreducibly de re--Is true of proper names. The conclusion is that the restriction to proper names is not, By itself, Sufficient to render the de re and de dicto equivalent
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DOI 10.1007/BF00367001
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