Dialectica 48 (3-4):307-36 (1994)
SummaryAgainst an externalist view popularized, among others, by Evans and McDowell I shall show fiat object‐dependent thoughts are psychologically spurious. This version of externalism is contrasted with the picture that thoughts are object‐independent. It is argued that object‐independent thoughts are perspectival and context‐sensitive and that these perspectival thoughts, unlike object‐dependent thoughts: deal with delusion in an intuitive and elegant way; support psychological generalizations in a straightforward way; do not need to be fully articulated and, as such, fit with an economical rule governing our thinking activity. To state my point I shall mainly concentrate on perceptual thoughts and emphasize how they are contextually related to the external world
|Keywords||Content Epistemology Externalism Knowledge Object Psychology Thought|
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Indexical Identification: A Perspectival Account.Tomis Kapitan - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):293 – 312.
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