Philosophical Studies 169 (3):355-378 (2014)

Authors
Jennifer Corns
University of Glasgow
Abstract
Though pain scientists now understand pain to be a complex experience typically composed of sensation, emotion, cognition, and motivational responses, many philosophers maintain that pain is adequately characterized by one privileged aspect of this complexity. Philosophically dominant unitary accounts of pain as a sensation or perception are here evaluated by their ability to explain actual cases—and found wanting. Further, it is argued that no forthcoming unitary characterization of pain is likely to succeed. Instead, I contend that both the motivating intuitions behind unitary accounts and the wide range of pain phenomena are best accommodated by a componential view of pain that does not privilege any single component as necessary or sufficient
Keywords Pain  Qualia  Perception  Sensation  Hallucination  Illusion
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0186-7
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
What Makes Pains Unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Sensory Qualities.Austen Clark - 1992 - Clarendon Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Pain.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Recent Work on Pain.Jennifer Corns - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):737-753.

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