Fine’s Monster Objection Defanged

Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
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The Monster objection has been often considered one of the main reasons to explore non- standard mereological views, such as hylomorphism. Still, it has been rarely discussed and then only in a cursory fashion. This paper fills this gap by offering the first thorough assessment of the objection. It argues that different metaphysical stances, such as presentism, three- and four-dimensionalism, provide different ways of undermining the objection.

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Author Profiles

Damiano Costa
University Of Italian Switzerland
Claudio Calosi
Université de Genève
Alessandro Cecconi
University of Geneva

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1987 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Cornell University Press.

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