Fine’s Monster Objection Defanged

Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):435-451 (2023)
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Abstract

The Monster Objection has often been considered one of the main reasons to explore non-standard mereological views, such as hylomorphism. Still, it has been rarely discussed and then only in a cursory fashion. This paper fills this gap by offering the first thorough assessment of the objection. It argues that different metaphysical stances, such as presentism and three- and four-dimensionalism, provide different ways of undermining the objection.

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Author Profiles

Alessandro Cecconi
University of Geneva
Damiano Costa
Università della Svizzera Italiana
Claudio Calosi
University of Venice

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter M. Simons - 1987 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.

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