Non-adjunctive inference and classical modalities

Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (5/6):581 - 605 (2005)
The article focuses on representing different forms of non-adjunctive inference as sub-Kripkean systems of classical modal logic, where the inference from □A and □B to □A ∧ B fails. In particular we prove a completeness result showing that the modal system that Schotch and Jennings derive from a form of non-adjunctive inference in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980) is a classical system strictly stronger than EMN and weaker than K (following the notation for classical modalities presented in Chellas, 1980). The unified semantical characterization in terms of neighborhoods permits comparisons between different forms of non-adjunctive inference. For example, we show that the non-adjunctive logic proposed in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980) is not adequate in general for representing the logic of high probability operators. An alternative interpretation of the forcing relation of Schotch and Jennings is derived from the proposed unified semantics and utilized in order to propose a more fine-grained measure of epistemic coherence than the one presented in (Schotch and Jennings, 1980). Finally we propose a syntactic translation of the purely implicative part of Jaśkowski's system D₂ into a classical system preserving all the theorems (and non-theorems) explicilty mentioned in (Jaśkowski, 1969). The translation method can be used in order to develop epistemic semantics for a larger class of non-adjunctive (discursive) logics than the ones historically investigated by Jaśkowski
Keywords classical modal logic  epistemic logic  high probability operators  paraconsistent logic  non-adjunctive logic
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-004-8539-5
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References found in this work BETA
Jaakko Hintikka (1962). Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
P. K. Schotch & R. E. Jennings (1980). Inference and Necessity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (3):327-340.

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Isaac Levi (2012). Deductive Closure. Synthese 186 (2):493-499.

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