Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):387 - 396 (1989)

The difference between carnap's and de finetti's conceptions of probability does not consist of a couple of requirements, As carnap asserted in a letter to de finetti. The paper is intended to give a theoretical justification for this denial. In order to do this, The author stresses the difference between (tolerant) objectivism and (radical) subjectivism. The difference is discussed in statistical terms. The discussion is faced with respect to predictive inferences, A type of statistical inference that both carnap and de finetti advocate in many occasions
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DOI 10.1007/BF01236571
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