Sophia 57 (4):535-545 (2018)

Christian Coseru
College of Charleston
This paper provides an outline and critical introduction to a symposium on Garfield’s Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy. The main issues addressed concern: (i) the problem of personal identity, specifically the issue of whether the no-self view can satisfactorily account for such phenomena as agency, responsibility, rationality, and subjectivity, and the synchronic unity of consciousness they presuppose; (ii) a critique of phenomenal realism, which is shown to rests on a false dilemma, namely: either we must take people’s introspective reports as reliable testimony, or see the task of phenomenology as necessarily involving what people believe about their introspective report; and (iii) the consequences of adopting Garfield’s physicalist stance for our understanding of Buddhist views of consciousness and the self.
Keywords Buddhist Philosophy  Cosmopolitanism  Phenomenal Realism  Cross-Cultural Philosophy  Consciousness
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DOI 10.1007/s11841-018-0696-z
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What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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