Abstract

The dissertation begins by explaining the author's motivation in developing a theory of events. A theory of events is desirable, not only for its intrinsic metaphysical interest, but also in order to provide the resources needed to resolve a wide range of philosophic problems. With this motivation in mind, it is argued that the Alvin Goldman/Jaegwon Kim view of events as property exemplifications at times provides the best starting point for the development of the theory. The Goldman/Kim view of events is explained in more detail and is expanded and clarified at necessary points. The Goldman/Kim event identity conditions are defended against the views of Miles Brand, Donald Davidson, Judith Thomson and Elizabeth Anscombe. ;Certain problems, familiar from the literature, concerning the composition and time of occurrence of events are examined. It is argued that the correct resolution of these problems requires a clear explication of the event-part relation. The Goldman/Kim identity conditions are found to be seriously inadequate in not providing such an explanation. It is suggested that by viewing the exemplification of properties by events as bone fide events, an account of event-part relations is easily developed. Original event identity and part conditions are formulated which incorporate these insights. The operation of these conditions is demonstrated on a number of examples. ;The resources developed to this point are applied to the question of whether there are "negative" events. It is argued that there are not, and that statements that seem to commit us to the existence of "negative" events can be plausibly construed in a way that does not so commit us. An explanation of the notion of an object's causing an event is developed. Next, the nature of actions is examined. It is argued that actions are complex events; they are a certain variety of causings. Intentions are found to be constituents of actions rather than their causes. An account of intentional action and an agent's causing an event are also developed. ;The relationship between a theory of events and a theory of seeing is examined. It is argued that a theory of events is needed to uncover the constituents of an event of seeing, and that unless an event of seeing is analyzable into constituents, it is difficult to explain how a scientific account of seeing and a philosophical account can be about the same event. ;Various theories of seeing are critically examined, and it is argued that an "epistemic" account of seeing provides the best prospects for success. David Armstrong's epistemic theory is examined and found to have serious drawbacks, notably in needing to talk about acquiring inclinations to acquire beliefs. An original causal/epistemic theory of seeing is developed using the resources of the previously developed theory of events. Seeing an object is found to be a complex event consisting of a causal chain of events holding between the object seen and the acquiring of beliefs in the perceiver. The need to talk about acquiring inclinations to acquire beliefs is avoided by drawing a distinction between evidential beliefs and theoretical beliefs. It is argued that every event of seeing an object includes the acquiring of some evidential beliefs. ;Finally, the progress made in the dissertation is summarized and prospects are examined for the further application of the resources developed in the dissertation. It is noted that the resources are applicable to the analysis of any kind of event or action. It is also suggested that they can be used to provide an explanation of at least one kind of scientific reduction.