Jonathan Cottrell
University of Edinburgh
in the treatise, hume claims to identify many “fictions of the imagination” among both “vulgar” and philosophical beliefs. To name just a few, these include the fiction of one aggregate composed of many parts,1 the fiction of a material object’s identity through change, and the fiction of a human mind’s identity through change and interruption in its existence. Hume claims that these fictions and others like them are somehow defective: in his words, they are “improper,” “inexact,” or not “strict”. I will argue that this claim conflicts with other commitments..
Keywords David Hume  Fiction  Imagination  Abstract Ideas
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2016.0023
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Difficult Times for Humean Identity? [REVIEW]Don Garrett - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):435 - 443.

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Hume’s Answer to Bayle on the Vacuum.Jonathan Cottrell - 2019 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 101 (2):205-236.
Hume's Dual Criteria for Memory.Maité Cruz - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):336-358.

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