Dialogue 56 (3):407-430 (2017)

Authors
Charles Cote-Bouchard
Université de Montréal
Abstract
What is the source of epistemic normativity? In virtue of what do epistemic norms have categorical normative authority? According to epistemic teleologism, epistemic normativity comes from value. Epistemic norms have categorical authority because conforming to them is necessarily good in some relevant sense. In this article, I argue that epistemic teleologism should be rejected. The problem, I argue, is that there is no relevant sense in which it is always good to believe in accordance with epistemic norms, including in cases where the matter at hand is completely trivial. Therefore, if epistemology is normative, its normativity won't come from value.
Keywords Epistemic normativity  Metaepistemology  Epistemic norms  Epistemic value  Normativity  Epistemology  Metanormativity  Value
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DOI 10.1017/s0012217317000506
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References found in this work BETA

Perceptual Entitlement.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.
Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.
Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
XV—The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.

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Fittingness.Christopher Howard - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12542.

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