Economics and Philosophy 9 (1):25-51 (1993)

Abstract
One calls a lot of things propositions. If one sees this, then one can discard the idea Russell and Frege had that logic is a science of certain objects – propositions, functions, the logical constants – and that logic is like a natural science such as zoology and talks about these objects as zoology talks of animals. Like a natural science, it could supposedly discover certain relations. For example, Keynes claimed to discover a probability relation which was like implication, yet not quite implication. But logic is a calculus, not a natural science, and in it one can make inventions but not discoveries. Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.
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DOI 10.1017/S0266267100005101
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References found in this work BETA

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
The Emperor’s New Mind.Roger Penrose - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Papers.J. L. Austin - 1961 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Keynes After Ramsey: In Defence of a Treatise on Probability.Jochen Runde - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (1):97-121.

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