Keynes's Theory of Probability and Its Relevance to His Economics: Three Theses

Economics and Philosophy 9 (1):25-51 (1993)
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Abstract

One calls a lot of things propositions. If one sees this, then one can discard the idea Russell and Frege had that logic is a science of certain objects – propositions, functions, the logical constants – and that logic is like a natural science such as zoology and talks about these objects as zoology talks of animals. Like a natural science, it could supposedly discover certain relations. For example, Keynes claimed to discover a probability relation which was like implication, yet not quite implication. But logic is a calculus, not a natural science, and in it one can make inventions but not discoveries.Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind ofseeingon our part; it is ouracting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.

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Keynes after Ramsey: In defence of a treatise on probability.Jochen Runde - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (1):97-121.

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References found in this work

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1965 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
On Certainty (ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - San Francisco: Harper Torchbooks. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright & Mel Bochner.
The emperor’s new mind.Roger Penrose - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1925 - London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Edited by R. B. Braithwaite.

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