Philosophy of Science 71 (2):198-204 (2004)
Kim claims that Bechtel and Mundale's case against multiple realization depends on the wrong kind of evidence. The latter argue that neuroscientific practice shows neural states across individuals and species are type identical. Kim replies that the evidence they cite to support this is irrelevant. I defend Bechtel and Mundale by showing why the evidence they cite is relevant and shows multiple realization does not occur.
|Keywords||Mental States Multiple Neuroscience Realization Science Bechtel, W Kim, J Mundale, J|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Multiple Realization in Comparative Perspective.Mark B. Couch - 2009 - Biology and Philosophy 24 (4):505-519.
Mind-Brain Correlations, Identity, and Neuroscience.Brandon N. Towl - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):187 - 202.
Multiple Realizability Intuitions and the Functionalist Conception of the Mind.William Ramsey - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):53-73.
Ahistorical Homology and Multiple Realizability.Sergio Balari & Guillermo Lorenzo - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):881-902.
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