Multiple realization in comparative perspective

Biology and Philosophy 24 (4):505-519 (2009)

Authors
Mark Couch
Seton Hall University
Abstract
Arguments for multiple realization depend on the idea that the same kind of function is realized by different kinds of structures. It is important to such arguments that we know the kinds used in the arguments have been individuated properly. In the philosophical literature, though, claims about how to individuate kinds are frequently decided on intuitive grounds. This paper criticizes this way of approaching kinds by considering how practicing researchers think about the matter. I will consider several examples in which the practice of researchers on comparative vision conflicts with the standard account of these issues.
Keywords Philosophy   Evolutionary Biology   Philosophy of Biology
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DOI 10.1007/s10539-009-9163-0
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References found in this work BETA

Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.
The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism.Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (4):542-564.
Natural Laws in Scientific Practice.Marc Lange - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Where Do You Get Your Protein? Or: Biochemical Realization.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Multiple Realization in Systems Biology.Wei Fang - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
The Functional Unity of Special Science Kinds.D. A. Weiskopf - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):233-258.
Explanatory Power of Extended Cognition.Samuli Pöyhönen - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):735-759.
Some Concerns with Polger and Shapiro’s View.Mark Couch - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):419-430.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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