Judgments about moral responsibility and determinism in patients with behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia: Still compatibilists
Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):851-864 (2012)
Do laypeople think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Recently, philosophers and psychologists trying to answer this question have found contradictory results: while some experiments reveal people to have compatibilist intuitions, others suggest that people could in fact be incompatibilist. To account for this contradictory answers, Nichols and Knobe (2007) have advanced a ‘performance error model’ according to which people are genuine incompatibilist that are sometimes biased to give compatibilist answers by emotional reactions. To test for this hypothesis, we investigated intuitions about determinism and moral responsibility in patients suffering from behavioural frontotemporal dementia. Patients suffering from bvFTD have impoverished emotional reaction. Thus, the ‘performance error model’ should predict that bvFTD patients will give less compatibilist answers. However, we found that bvFTD patients give answers quite similar to subjects in control group and were mostly compatibilist. Thus, we conclude that the ‘performance error model’ should be abandoned in favour of other available model that best fit our data.
|Keywords||Experimental Philosophy Free Will Moral Responsibility Neuropsychology Emotions Frontotemporal Dementia|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions About Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.
Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.
Persistent Bias in Expert Judgments About Free Will and Moral Responsibility: A Test of the Expertise Defense.E. Schultz, E. T. Cokely & A. Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.
Gender and Philosophical Intuition.Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich - 2014 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Vol.2. Oxford University Press.
Bad Acts, Blameworthy Agents, and Intentional Actions: Some Problems for Juror Impartiality.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):203 – 219.
Citations of this work BETA
Frankfurt-Style Cases User Manual: Why Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases Do Not Necessitate Tech Support.Florian Cova - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):505-521.
Explaining the Abstract/Concrete Paradoxes in Moral Psychology: The NBAR Hypothesis.Eric Mandelbaum & David Ripley - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):351-368.
A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.
Moral Responsibility and Free Will: A Meta-Analysis.Adam Feltz & Florian Cova - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:234-246.
Experimental Philosophy of Actual and Counterfactual Free Will Intuitions.Adam Feltz - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:113-130.
Similar books and articles
Metacognitive Judgment and Denial of Deﬁcit: Evidence From Frontotemporal Dementia.Sandra E. Black - unknown
Impaired Recognition of Negative Facial Emotions in Patients with Frontotemporal Dementia.S. E. Black - unknown
Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions.Eddy Nahmias & Dylan Murray - 2010 - In Jesus Aguilar, Andrei Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 189--215.
Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions.Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.
Experimental Philosophy and the Problem of Free Will.Shaun Nichols - 2011 - Science 331 (6023):1401-1403.
Responsibility and the Aims of Theory: Strawson and Revisionism.Manuel Vargas - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):218-241.
Judgments of Moral Responsibility – a Unified Account.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2009 - In  Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 35th Annual Meeting (Bloomington, IN; June 12-14). pp. 326-354.
Compatibilist Fatalism.Paul Russell - 2000 - In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 199--218.
The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2012 - Noûs 46 (2):326-354.
Folk Fears About Freedom and Responsibility: Determinism Vs. Reductionism.Eddy A. Nahmias - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):215-237.
Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?Hagop Sarkissian, Amita Chatterjee, Felipe De Brigard, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols & Smita Sirker - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (3):346-358.
Moral Responsibility and History Revisited.Alfred R. Mele - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):463 - 475.
Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
Added to index2012-02-17
Total downloads548 ( #2,811 of 2,168,640 )
Recent downloads (6 months)28 ( #11,473 of 2,168,640 )
How can I increase my downloads?