Locke on consciousness

History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (3):221-242 (2008)
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Abstract

Locke’s theory of consciousness is often appropriated as a forerunner of present-day Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theories, but not much is said about it beyond that. We offer an interpretation of Locke’s account of consciousness that portrays it as crucially different from current-day HOP theory, both in detail and in spirit. In this paper, it is argued that there are good historical and philosophical reasons to attribute to Locke the view not that conscious states are accompanied by higher-order perceptions, but rather that conscious states constitute perceptions of themselves.

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Angela M. Coventry
Portland State University

Citations of this work

The Subject of Experience.Galen Strawson - 2017 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Mental Strength: A Theory of Experience Intensity.Jorge Morales - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):1-21.
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Self-intimation.Galen Strawson - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):1-31.

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References found in this work

A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.
Locke, Berkeley, Hume; Central Themes.Jonathan Bennett - 1971 - Oxford,: Oxford University Press UK.

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