Moral Evaluation Shapes Linguistic Reports of Others' Psychological States, Not Theory-of-Mind Judgments

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):334-335 (2010)

Authors
Pierre Jacob
Institut Jean Nicod
Abstract
We use psychological concepts (e.g., intention and desire) when we ascribe psychological states to others for purposes of describing, explaining, and predicting their actions. Does the evidence reported by Knobe show, as he thinks, that moral evaluation shapes our mastery of psychological concepts? We argue that the evidence so far shows instead that moral evaluation shapes the way we report, not the way we think about, others' psychological states.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s0140525x10001718
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment.Dean Pettit & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (5):586-604.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On Doing Things Intentionally.Pierre Jacob, Cova Florian & Dupoux Emmanuel - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (4):378-409.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-12-01

Total views
457 ( #11,007 of 2,280,598 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
61 ( #13,160 of 2,280,598 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature