Two kinds of respect for two kinds of contempt: Why contempt can be both a sentiment and an emotion

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40 (2017)
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Abstract

Gervais & Fessler argue that because contempt is a sentiment, it cannot be an emotion. However, like many affective labels, it could be that “contempt” refers both to a sentiment and to a distinct emotion. This possibility is made salient by the fact that contempt can be defined by contrast with respect, but that there are different kinds of respect.

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Author Profiles

Fabrice Teroni
University of Geneva
Florian Cova
University of Geneva
Julien Deonna
University of Geneva